| I. INTRODUCTION
|
| January 1, 2004, marked the
opening of hunting season on California employers. On that
date, The Labor Code Private Attorney Generals Act of 2004,
went into effect. Enacted as SB 796 (Labor Code §2698
et seq.), this law authorizes employees to bring private
actions to enforce existing penalties for all Labor Code
violations (except workers’ compensation claims) and
creates new penalties for violations when the Labor Code
does not establish a specific penalty. The new law provides
for representative actions and creates powerful financial
incentives to bring such actions by giving employees 25%
of any penalties awarded plus attorney’s fees. SB
796 has no counterpart in any other state or federal labor
law and was quickly dubbed the “bounty hunter”
law, casting California employers in the role of “wanted”
outlaws.
The bounty hunter law was jointly sponsored by the California
Labor Federation, AFL-CIO, and the California Rural Legal
Assistance Foundation. It was signed by Governor Davis in
his last few days in office, after his defeat in the recall
election. According to the Senate’s Analysis, the
rationale for SB 796 was that, despite having the largest
government labor law enforcement mechanism in the country,
“the DIR [Department of Industrial Relations] was
failing to effectively enforce labor law violations.”
According to the Bill’s sponsors, in view of its budgetary
problems, California needed “a creative solution that
will help the state crack down on labor law violators.”
Their “creative solution” is SB 796. Of course,
the judiciary also is part of the State government, and
the SB 796 will dump a large new class of cases on an already
overburdened judicial system. |
| II. BACKGROUND |
| Employees in California long
have enjoyed more legal protection than employees in any
other state. The main source of these protections is the
California Labor Code, which regulates almost every aspect
of the employment relationship, from major areas such as
wages and hours, and worker safety and health, to housekeeping
items such as the placement of informational posters. Where
the Labor Code and federal law overlap (e.g., in laws governing
employee wages and working hours), the more favorable-to-employees
provisions of the Labor Code govern.
The Labor Code is a voluminous hodgepodge of obscure and
often ignored laws, many of which were enacted under very
different circumstances than exist today and which have
been neither enforced nor repealed. For example, Labor Code
§431, enacted in 1937, provides that employers who
require job applicants to sign employment applications (which
all employers do) must file a copy of the application with
the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”),
something that is rarely, if ever, done. In addition to
dealing with the minutiae of employment relations, the Labor
Code regulates whole areas of employment relationships that
are not regulated by federal law or the laws of most other
states, such as agricultural labor relations. It is enforced
by the Labor and Welfare Development Agency (“LWDA”),
which consists of a number of sub-agencies that make it
the largest state labor law enforcement agency in the country.
The Labor Code is supplemented by: (a) voluminous regulations
issued by the numerous agencies established by the Labor
Code; (b) employee rights established in other California
Codes (e.g. the prohibition of many kinds of employment
discrimination in the Government Code); (c) local ordinances;
(d) the California Unfair Competition Law (Business and
Professions Code §§17200 et seq.), which enables
employees to enforce many federal labor laws in state court;
and (e) an extensive web of pro-employee state court decisions.
The necessary corollary of all the rights created by the
Labor Code is that California employers are subject to unparalleled
obligations to their employees, creating an almost European
situation of detailed government regulation of private employment
relationships. Indeed, the position of employers in California
vis-à-vis their employees is more precarious than
that of European employers because many employment laws
in California are enforced through the civil litigation
system, which greatly increases both the exposure of employers
and the cost of resolving claims.
Fortunately, many of the provisions of the Labor Code have
not imposed penalties for their violation, and where the
Labor Code has established penalties for violations other
than those dealing with the payment of wages, they have
been enforceable only by the various specialized agencies
created by the Labor Code. [1] Employees long have had the
right to pursue claims for unpaid wages, including overtime
and wage payment-related penalties, directly in court or
to pursue their claims through the Labor Commissioner.
Vesting exclusive authority to enforce all other penalties
under the Labor Code (e.g. for unsafe working conditions)
in these agencies has operated both to filter out spurious
claims and to provide simplified and expedited procedures
for resolving employee claims at no cost to the employee.
California employers also have been protected from private
enforcement of penalty claims under the Unfair Competition
Law, which most observers agree has fostered abusive litigation
against businesses.[2] SB 796 eliminated this limitation
on private enforcement of penalty claims, thereby opening
the door to the same kind of “shakedown” litigation
against employers that has been rampant under the Unfair
Competition Law. |
| III. BASIC
PROVISIONS |
| 1. Private right of action.
Any “aggrieved employee” (i.e. “any person
who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom
one or more of the alleged violations was committed”)
is authorized to sue his or her present or former employer
in Superior Court for violation of any provision of the
Labor Code, except those relating to workers’ compensation.
Under prior law, only agencies under the LWDA, such as the
Labor Commissioner and the DLSE, could sue to enforce penalties
under the Labor Code. This new right of action is in addition
to any other pre-existing remedies and does not preclude
separate or concurrent pursuit of these other remedies.
Like the Unfair Competition Law: (1) there is no requirement
that the employee actually have suffered any damages or
injuries in order to sue , [3] and (2) even if the underlying
Labor Code provision does not create a private right of
action, SB 796 does. Interestingly, SB 796 also creates
liability for labor unions committing unfair labor practices
under the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (the “ALRA”),
which is part of the Labor Code, but only employees can
sue for union unfair labor practices under the new law even
where it is an employer that has been the victim of a union
unfair labor practice (e.g. a secondary boycott).
2. Amount of claim.
The amount of the claim is either the amount of the civil
penalty
established in the Labor Code or, if none is specified:
(1) $500 for employers with no employees at the time of
the violation;
(2) $100 for employers with one or more employees for the
“initial” violation for each aggrieved employee
per pay period and $200 according to the same formula for
each “subsequent” violation.
As a result, employers will be exposed to substantial
liability for Labor Code violations
that previously had no penalties, and the penalties will
bear no relation to the seriousness of the employer’s
violation.
For example, if an employer with 500 employees fails to
post a required informational poster for one year (assuming
a semi-monthly payroll with 24 pay periods), it would be
liable for a fine of $1,200,000, plus attorneys fees and
costs. If the employer used a weekly payroll, the penalty
would more than double to $2,600,000 over one year. It is
unclear what constitutes an initial violation. [4] If the
failure to post in each payroll period is treated as a separate
violation, the penalty for the first year would almost double
to $2,350,000 (assuming 24 pay periods per year). With a
weekly payroll, the yearly toll would be $5,150,000).
It also is unclear whether violations of the Labor Code
must be related (i.e. violate the same provision of the
Labor Code) in order for the doubled penalty of $200 per
employee to apply. If not, an employer that committed two
completely unrelated minor violations would be subject to
the doubled penalty for each subsequent violation.
3. Attorney’s fees.
A prevailing employee is entitled to an award of “reasonable
attorney’s fees” and costs. There is no provision
for attorney’s fees for employers who successfully
defend these claims.
4. Distribution of penalties.
50 percent goes to the State General Fund; 25 percent to
the LWDA; and 25 percent to the aggrieved employees (the
“bounty”).
5. Exhaustion.
There is no requirement that employees exhaust their administrative
remedies before filing suit. Nor are employees bringing
suit required even to notify any government agency responsible
for enforcing the section of the Labor Code under which
they are suing. (California’s other “bounty
hunter” law, Proposition 65, The Toxic Enforcement
and Safe Water Act of 1986, requires such notice, thereby
providing at least some minimal connection between government
and private enforcement of the environmental laws. SB 796
contains no such requirement). The result is to create two
separate and unrelated schemes for enforcing the Labor Code.
6. Limitations.
No private action may be filed if the appropriate agency
has “cited” an employer for the same Labor Code
violation that is the basis for the action. Otherwise, an
employee is free to pursue any other remedy under state
or federal law based upon the same claimed employer misconduct.
It is unclear what “cited” means. For example,
if a Complaint has been issued against an agricultural employer
for an unfair labor practice but the ALRB has not made a
finding that the employer has committed the claimed unfair
labor practice, is a private suit barred?
7. Scope of claims.
Claims may be brought for violations of any provision of
the Labor Code (except those relating to workers’
compensation) including claims for violations of wage-hour
provisions, CAL-OSHA, and the ALRA. Thus, in addition to
giving employees a private right of action to enforce existing
penalties, SB 796 creates whole new categories of Labor
Code provisions that subject employers to liability for
penalties. Since many employment discrimination claims (such
as race and age discrimination claims) are governed by the
Government Code, they are not subject to SB 796. But twenty-five
forms of employment discrimination are covered by the Labor
Code and subject to SB 796. For example, discriminating
against employees because of their sex in determining their
pay violates Labor Code §1197.5, so that, in addition
to other remedies (e.g. recovering back pay and liquidated
damages), employees subject to gender-based pay discrimination
may recover penalties under SB 796.
8. Penalties Discretionary.
Even if an employer is found to have violated a provision
of the Labor Code, the assessment of penalties is discretionary
if the LWDA or its subdivisions had discretion as to whether
to impose a penalty. It is unclear whether that same discretion
operates where the Labor Code did not previously establish
a penalty for a violation, so that for such violations,
the penalties established by SB 796 either would be mandatory
or not subject to any legislative standards as to how the
court should exercise its discretion. Moreover, SB 796 does
not permit a court to exercise any discretion as to the
amount of the penalty.
|
| IV. ANALYSIS
|
| SB 796 is a significant step
in a process that has been ongoing for many decades: increasing
legal regulation of the employment relationship. While SB
796 itself does not impose any new workplace rules, it is
certain to increase the burden of existing rules by creating
powerful financial incentives, both for California employees
and their lawyers, to initiate litigation in response to
even the most trivial violations of the Labor Code. By encouraging
employees to seek “bounties” against the employers
who generate their jobs, SB 796 is certain to be corrosive
of the kind of cooperative employer-employee relations necessary
for a productive, competitive economy.
Moreover, SB 796 undermines the basic tenet of modern
administrative law, which is to have specialized, expert
government agencies regulate complex areas of our economy
based on legislative standards, with the judiciary’s
role limited to reviewing whether the agency’s action
complied with the standards established by the legislature.
Vesting the courts with initial jurisdiction to enforce
regulatory legislation vitiates the well-established doctrines
of primary jurisdiction and abstention. It puts courts of
general jurisdiction in the position of having to interpret
and apply legislative standards that were intended to be
interpreted and applied initially by agencies established
specifically to deal with what are often deliberately vague
standards, based on the agencies’ expertise.
For example, Labor Code §6400 requires employers
to “furnish employment and a place of
employment that is safe and healthful for the employees
therein.” The Legislature went on to
establish a specialized agency, the Division of Occupational
Safety and Health (the “Division”),
to develop and enforce detailed regulations as to what “safe
and healthful” means. Under SB
796, any employee will be able to go directly to court and
sue on behalf of all affected
employees to recover penalties for working conditions alleged
not to be “safe and healthful,”
even if the Division has not determined them to be so. Similarly,
under Labor Code §1153(f),
an employer of agricultural workers is obligated to bargain
“in good faith” with a union
representing its employees. The Legislature established
the Agricultural Labor Relations Board
(“ALRB”) to interpret and apply this broad statutory
command, but under SB 736, if an
employee claims that his employer is not negotiating in
good faith, he can sue and a Superior
Court Judge, not the ALRB, will determine how this vague
language is to be applied. |
| V. EMPLOYER
RESPONSE |
| What should employers do in response to
SB 796? The new legislation makes it even more
important for employers to practice preventive law by:
1. converting as many employees as possible to a semi-monthly
rather than a weekly payroll
so as to reduce the number of pay periods that are the basis
for computing liability;
2. educating themselves as to all provisions of the Labor
Code that are effective as of
January 1, 2004;
3. auditing their employment practices and policies to ensure
that they are in
compliance with even the most minor requirements of the
Labor Code;
4. training foremen and supervisors as to Labor Code requirements;
and
5. providing an employee complaint procedure that encourages
employees to bring possible Labor Code violations to the
employer’s attention as soon as possible, thereby
minimizing the employer’s liability. While it is unclear
whether an employer’s good faith or an employees’
deliberate delay in asserting a claim under the Labor Code
will be defenses to suits under SB 796, such a complaint
procedure would go a long way towards establishing an employer’s
good faith in attempting to comply with the Labor Code.
This complaint procedure should be a part of an Employee
Handbook that spells out the company’s commitment
to comply with the Labor Code.
|
| VI. CONCLUSION
|
| As with any new legislation,
there are many unanswered questions about SB 796, especially
since there is nothing like it in other state or federal
labor laws. For example, does it apply to the violation
of regulations adopted by agencies pursuant to authority
vested in them by the Labor Code, or only to provisions
actually appearing in the Labor Code? There may even be
constitutional challenges. But one thing is certain: there
will be a significant increase in litigation against employers
by “bounty hunting” lawyers and “bounty”
seeking employees. |
| VII. FOOTNOTES
|
| [1] See Labor Code §§
218 and 1194. It should be noted that prior to the enactment
of SB 796, the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement took
inconsistent positions as to whether the amounts employers
must pay for a failure to provide rest and meal periods
under Labor Code §226.7 are “penalties”
(and therefore not enforceable through a private right of
action) or are “wages” (and therefore enforceable
in a private action).[5]
[2] Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 950 (2002). See,
e.g. Hiltzik, “Consumer-Protection Law Abused in Legal
Shakedown”, Los Angeles Times, July 21, 2003, p. C.1.
[3] Contrast this with Labor Code §2810, also enacted
in 2003, which requires that an employee be “injured
as a result of a violation of a labor law or regulation”
in order to be able to sue. SB 796 in effect eliminates
this requirement in so far as employees seek to recover
penalties. Thus, the combined effect of those two new laws
is to enable employees to sue under Labor Code §2810
for penalties on behalf of all affected employees, even
if none suffered any injury. SB 796 will have this same
kind of “multiplier” effect on many other Labor
Code provisions.
[4] Labor Code §22 defines “violation”
as “a failure to comply with any requirement of the
code.”
[5] Labor Code §204 specifically authorizes semi-monthly
payments. |
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