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A JUDICIAL VARIATION OF THE CHICKEN AND EGG PROBLEM:
WHICH COMES FIRST, THE PEOPLE OR THE WATER?

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Clark Morrison
Morrison & Foerster, LLP

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1. Introduction

A. Tiering EIRs
B. Diablo Grande Case -- Undermining Tiering’s Usefulness
C. Aftermath of Diablo Decision
D. Additional Events -- AB 1219 and the Save the Lakes Case

2. Land Use and Water Supply Planning Statutes

A. The Legislative Framework
B. How CEQA Fits in the Land Use/Water Supply Planning Scheme

3. The Save the Lakes Case

A. Factual Background
B. The Save the Lakes Opinion

4. Conclusion

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1. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a new emphasis has emerged in the already dense landscape of land use planning: "Integrating" water supply issues into the land use planning and environmental review processes.

Proponents of integration have prevailed in the Legislature to enact various statutory provisions requiring land use planning agencies to consider water supply issues and to "talk" to water agencies when carrying out their planning efforts. For example, in 1995 the Legislature amended the state Water Code and the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA") by enacting Senate Bill 901. SB 901 requires local governments to coordinate with local water supply agencies when contemplating new and significant development projects. Water Code §§ 10910-10915; Public Resources Code § 21151.9. At approximately the same time, the Legislature added section 65352.5 to Article 6 of the Government Code, requiring water agencies to provide specific information to cities and counties adopting or substantially amending a general plan. Gov. Code § 65352.5(b), (c).

A. Tiering EIRs

While the Legislature was busy integrating water supply planning into the overall land use planning process, local governments and developers were grappling with the related questions of whether local governments could approve land use plans before securing permanent water supplies, and when permanent water supplies had to be secured for anticipated development. These questions typically arose in the context of CEQA lawsuits, and involved the practice of "tiering" environmental impact reports ("EIRs") to avoid redundancy in the environmental review of related projects. See Public Resources Code §§ 21068.5, 21093.

"Tiering" means preparing an initial EIR to cover general matters and environmental effects of a plan, policy, program or ordinance, and preparing subsequent more focused EIRs for specific aspects of the broader plan. See Public Resources Code §§ 21068.5, 21093; see also Koster v. County of San Joaquin, 47 Cal. App. 4th 29 (1996). In approving of tiering, the Legislature expressly declared that EIRs "shall be tiered whenever feasible," to avoid "duplicative analysis" and "repetitive discussions of the same issues" in successive EIRs. Public Resources Code § 21093.

B. Diablo Grande Case -- Undermining Tiering’s Usefulness

While, in theory, tiering offers a practical and efficient tool for integrating water supply issues into the overall land use planning scheme, a series of mid-1990s court decisions succeeded in undermining its usefulness as a planning tool. Most prominent among these decisions was Stanislaus National Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus, 48 Cal. App. 4th 182 (1996) (the “Diablo Grande” case). In Diablo Grande, the court invalidated a county’s first-tier EIR for a specific plan because, it found, the county had not adequately addressed the environmental impacts of acquiring a long-term water supply for the proposed development. Project proponents had secured sufficient water to sustain the first five years of project buildout, but had not done so for the remaining twenty years. Acknowledging that securing a long-term water supply would impose significant impacts, the county certified an EIR that prohibited development beyond the initial, five-year period “unless the applicant can show to the County’s satisfaction that adequate water supplies have been made available, and that the environmental impacts of those sources have been studied and mitigated per CEQA requirements.” Diablo Grande, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 195. The court found that this was an improper use of tiering and held, in essence, that the county cannot approve a plan providing for long-term growth without thoroughly evaluating the impacts of providing water for all the anticipated growth.

Opponents of economic development heralded the Diablo Grande decision as a watershed (no pun intended), arguing that local governments would now be required to secure, and perhaps even pay for, permanent water supplies before they could approve general or specific land use plans, and claiming the decision would effectively “slow, or even halt, new town development in California” through litigation. More moderate observers thought otherwise, noting that the court expressly stated,

“we are not concluding respondent must first find a source of water before an EIR will be adequate. We are concluding that an EIR for this project must address the impact of supplying water for the project.”

Id. at 640. In retrospect, the lasting significance of this decision appears to be that cities and counties now require developers to at least identify, and in some cases secure, water supplies for significant, proposed developments in their jurisdictions before approving their land use plans.

C. Aftermath of Diablo Decision

Although these statutory and judicial developments were less than optimal from the developers’ perspective, they at least provided some guidance in an area that had theretofore been marked by an absence of dispostive authority. By clarifying the role of water agencies in the land use planning scheme, the Legislature had established that cities and counties were required to consider water supply issues when contemplating long-term land use plans, and by requiring developers to demonstrate that water was available for their projects, the courts had described -- at least at a general level -- CEQA's requirements for reviewing the environmental impacts of providing water for anticipated growth.

D. Additional Events -- AB 1219 and the Save the Lakes Case

In 1999, two events added to the mix.

(i). AB 1219.

First, in February, assemblywoman Sheila Kuehl of Santa Monica introduced Assembly Bill 1219. AB 1219 represents yet another legislative attempt to further integrate water issues into the land use planning scheme by injecting water agencies directly into the process. As proposed, AB 1219 would take the unprecedented and unwarranted step of conditioning residential developments of a certain size on the willingness of a water agency to serve the project. In effect, AB 1219 would provide water agencies with the ability to ‘veto’ development proposals that have the support of local government agencies, thereby shifting land use authority away from cities and counties, where it belongs, to water agencies, who have no authority, experience or expertise in this area.

(ii). Save the Lakes Case

Second, in November 1999, the Third Appellate District decided the case of County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency, 1999 Cal. App. LEXIS 1065 (1999) (the “Save the Lakes” case), invalidating a water agency’s EIR because, the court said, it was “predicated on a draft, unadopted general plan.” Save the Lakes, 1999 Cal. App. LEXIS at *2. In its published opinion, the court strongly suggests that a water agency cannot commence efforts to acquire water for anticipated development until the local government agency with jurisdiction over the proposed development has approved the relevant land use plans.

This suggestion is distressing because, when read together with the Diablo Grande case, the two cases appear to put local governments in an impossible bind: Under Diablo Grande, they cannot approve land use plans until they’ve identified water supplies, but under Save the Lakes, they cannot obtain water supplies until they’ve approved land use plans.

(iii). Fall Out of Both Events.

Fortunately, the outlook for local governments is not quite so bleak. As of press time, it appears that the more draconian aspects of AB 1219 will not survive legislative scrutiny, and if AB 1219 ultimately becomes law, that law will be a kinder, gentler version of the original, knee-jerk response to the perceived threat of urban sprawl that emerged last February.

Unfortunately, there is no similar remedy for the Third District’s opinion in Save the Lakes. This is particularly troubling because, as explained below, the court’s opinion is flawed on a number of levels, from its unnecessarily broad reading of CEQA to its failure to respect the Legislature’s carefully-established balance between land use planning and water supply management. And although, as explained below, Save the Lakes may be reconciled with the Diablo Grande case to avoid the apparent Hobson’s choice described above, this reconciliation does not mitigate the significant adverse impacts on the recently settled legal landscape surrounding land use and water supply planning.

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2. LAND USE AND WATER SUPPLY PLANNING STATUTES

A. The Legislative Framework

Cities and counties are multi-purpose governments that balance an impressive array of responsibilities, with land use planning being among their primary businesses. In contrast, water agencies are single-purpose agencies whose primary responsibility is to provide customers with safe and reliable water. Not being imbued with police powers, the scope of their authority is limited and they are not generally empowered to exercise land use authority.

The Legislature has established a careful balance that preserves in cities and counties the authority to plan and regulate land use while simultaneously requiring water agencies to assist local governments by compiling and providing them with the information necessary to make informed land use decisions. This framework confirms that it is cities and counties that are ultimately responsible for land use decisions, and that the role of water agencies in land use planning is limited to advising those local governments concerning the availability of water within their respective districts.

(i). Inclusion of Conservation in General Plans -- Gov. Code Section 65302

Various provisions of the Government Code, the Water Code and CEQA require, on one hand, local governments to consult with water agencies that supply water to their respective jurisdictions, and on the other hand, water agencies to provide specific information in response to such requests. For example, Government Code section 65302(d) requires cities and counties to include in their general plans a conservation element that addresses “the conservation, development, and utilization of natural resources including water.” Gov. Code § 65302(d). Section 65302(d) further requires that the portion of the conservation element addressing water issues be developed “in coordination with any countywide water agency and with all district and city agencies which have developed, served, controlled or conserved water for any purposed for the county or city for which the plan is prepared.” Id.

(ii). Requirement of Consultation with Water Agencies -- Gov. Code Section 65352

Similarly, Government Code section 65352 requires local governments proposing to adopt or substantially amend a general plan to notify water agencies within their jurisdictions and give them 45 days to comment on their proposals. Section 65352.5 requires each such water agency to provide the local government, referred to as the “planning agency,” with all information “that is relevant to determining the adequacy of existing and planned future water supplies to meet existing and planned future demands on those water supplies,” including but not limited to a copy of the water agency’s urban water management plan, adopted pursuant to the Urban Water Management Planning Act (Water Code §§ 10610 et seq.). The information contained in the urban water supplier’s plan includes, among other things:

(1) the supplier’s service area, including current and projected populations;

(2) existing and planned sources of water available to the supplier;

(3) water supply reliability and vulnerability data;

(4) planned measures to obtain alternative supplies; and

(5) demand-side management measures, all for a twenty-year period commencing on the date of the plan. Water Code § 10631.

(iii). Expansion of Consultation Requirement – SB 901

In 1995, Senate Bill 901 expanded this consultation requirement beyond the context of adopting or ‘substantially’ amending a general plan. SB 901, as codified at Water Code sections 10910-10915, sets out a detailed procedure for cities and counties to follow when contemplating certain types of projects which are deemed under CEQA to be of “statewide, regional, or areawide significance.” See Water Code § 10913(a)-(f), CEQA Guidelines, § 15083.5; cf. CEQA Guidelines, § 15206(b).

(iv). Analysis of Sufficiency of Water Supplies -- Water Code § 10910

Any city or county preparing an EIR for a qualifying project must, as lead agency under CEQA, identify each water agency that may supply water for project and provide it with a copy of the Notice of Preparation. Water Code § 10910. At the same time, the city or county must ask each water agency to assess whether the water demand associated with the project was included in its most recent Urban Water Management Plan (prepared pursuant to section 10610), and whether that agency can meet the project’s expected demand for water. Id. If a water agency concludes that its existing supplies are insufficient to meet the anticipated needs of the project, it must notify the lead agency of any plans it has to acquire additional water supplies, including an estimated timetable for such acquisitions. Water Code § 10911. All of this information must be provided to the lead agency and included in the EIR, where the lead agency may, if it chooses, ‘evaluate’ the water agency’s conclusions. Id. Finally, “based on the entire record, the lead agency shall determine whether projected water supplies will be sufficient to satisfy the demands of the proposed project, in addition to existing and planned future uses.” Id.

(x). LAFCO - Gov. Code § 56375.

The Cortese-Knox Local Government Reorganization Act fits neatly into this planning hierarchy. Cortese-Knox created Local Agency Formation Commissions (“LAFCOs”) for each county in the state. Gov. Code § 56375. Among the LAFCOs’ numerous powers are the power to act on local agency boundary changes and the power to adopt spheres of influence of local agencies. Gov. Code § 56375. With respect to water agencies, this means it is the local LAFCO, not the water agency itself, that determines whether a water agency will serve a given population. Moreover, LAFCOs are expressly prohibited from regulating land uses. Gov. Code § 56375(a)(2). Thus, the LAFCO statute respects the cities’ and counties’ land use powers and confirms that water agencies are not empowered to affect land use decisions planning by extending or withholding service to a given region.

(xi). Conclusion from These Provisions.

Two important points emerge from these various provisions.

First, the Legislature clearly intends for cities and counties, and not water agencies, to have the final say as to whether economic development will go forward. See Water Code § 10911(c). That this discretion is vested with the cities and counties is also evidenced by Government Code section 65352(c)(1), which requires local governments preparing or amending general plans to obtain data about, among other things, public water systems and states, “[t]his section is directory, not mandatory, and the failure to refer a proposed action to the other entities specified in this section does not affect the validity of the action, if adopted.” Gov. Code § 65352(c)(1). Thus, the Legislature has expressly provided that local government planning approvals are not necessarily invalid even if made without consultation with the local water agency.

On the other side of the planning equation, the foregoing provisions also show, contrary to the Save the Lakes decision, that water agencies are not required to wait for local governments to approve land use plans that will result in increased water demands before they can take steps to acquire additional water supplies. Under the existing, carefully-crafted framework, the flow of information is primarily from water agencies to local governments. The water agencies are required to provide the cities and counties with assessments of their “existing and planned future water supplies.” There is nothing in any of these planning statutes that suggests water agencies must refrain from planning for or developing additional water supplies until local governments have approved land use plans that will increase the demand on their existing supplies.

B. How CEQA Fits in the Land Use/Water Supply Planning Scheme

While much legislative energy has been devoted to “integrating” land use and water supply planning, very little legislative brainpower has been employed to consider how CEQA fits into this framework. In fact, the only CEQA provision specifically addressing land use and water resource planning processes is Public Resources Code section 21151.9, which requires any city or county preparing an EIR for a project to comply with SB 901 (Water Code §§ 10910-10915).

Nonetheless, by requiring cities, counties and water agencies to prepare environmental impact reports and, where necessary, mitigation plans for activities deemed to significantly affect the environment, CEQA requires these agencies to engage in environmental planning. See, e.g., Diablo Grande, 48 Cal. App. 4th at 201-205. While CEQA compels public agencies to consider the environmental consequences of their proposed actions, however, its breadth of scope often creates duplicative obligations for different agencies arising out of the same project.

For example, a single, large residential development proposal may require both a general plan amendment by the local government and activity by the local water agency to acquire additional water to serve the increased population. From a practical standpoint, the city or county and the water agency may each prepare a separate EIR for their respective "projects." Because both CEQA “projects” involve the same physical changes to the environment, however, the environmental analyses required by CEQA of each agency will overlap and, if both agencies are required to prepare separate EIRs, they would to some extent be duplicative. Ideally, where the agencies are proceeding simultaneously, they can coordinate their CEQA compliance by jointly preparing a single EIR. Unfortunately, this kind of coordinated timing often is not possible, nor is it necessarily desirable.

Local governments may, for example, choose to prepare or amend their general plans to accommodate anticipated, long-term population growth absent any particular development proposals. In addition, water agencies are under a continuous obligation to seek out and acquire available water to meet anticipated and increasing demands. See, e.g., Swanson v. Marin Municipal Water District, 56 Cal. App. 3d 512, 524 (1976). This obligation does not depend upon a local government’s approving plans for increased growth. In other words, there are a variety of circumstances in which a water agency may act to supplement its water supplies to satisfy anticipated population growth, but be unable to coordinate its environmental review with the local land use planning agency so as to prepare a single EIR for that action.

It was in such a context that the Save the Lakes court addressed the question, ‘What does CEQA require of a water agency seeking to acquire additional water supplies in terms of analyzing the relationship between population growth and water supplies?’

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3. THE SAVE THE LAKES CASE

In Save the Lakes, the court held, among other things, that the El Dorado County Water Agency (“Water Agency”) and the El Dorado Irrigation District (“EID”) had violated CEQA by certifying an EIR that was, the court concluded, “predicated upon a draft, unadopted general plan.” Save the Lakes at *2.

The court’s opinion can be construed to stand for the proposition that CEQA prohibits a water agency from taking steps to supplement its existing water supply unless a local planning agency has approved a plan that would create a demand for such additional water. In fact, the court suggests it is impossible to comply with CEQA under these facts.

A. Factual Background

In March 1991, the El Dorado County Board of Supervisors was in the process of updating its general plan to meet projected population growth in the County. Anticipating an increased demand for water within their service areas, the Water Agency and EID filed a joint application with the State Water Resources Control Board (“SWRCB”) for the rights to divert water stored in three high Sierra lakes for consumption in the County (the “Project”). Although the “Project” consisted of primarily of submitting the water rights applications, and did not propose any construction or water supply or conveyance facilities, the Water Agency and Irrigation District prepared and circulated a draft EIR for the Project as required by CEQA.

During the comment period, the League to Save the Lakes argued that the draft EIR did not adequately address either the impact of the Project on the three Sierra lakes, or the relationship between growth in the County and the increased water supplies. Save the Lakes, 1999 Cal. App. LEXIS at *7. The Water Agency and Irrigation District disagreed and in May 1993, issued and certified a final EIR, accompanied by findings of fact and a statement of overriding considerations and posted a notice of determination. Save the Lakes, 1999 Cal. App. LEXIS at *8.

The League, Amador County, and the California Department of Fish & Game filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging this determination. Save the Lakes, 1999 Cal. App. LEXIS at *8-9. The trial court found, among other things, that the Water Agency’s and Irrigation District’s preparation and certification of the EIR “illegally preceded El Dorado County’s adoption of a new General Plan,” and granted the petition, and the court of appeals affirmed.

B. The Save the Lakes Opinion

In affirming the trial court’s decision, the court of appeals reasoned that “approving a water program before enacting a general plan places the proverbial cart before the horse,” and “precludes any proper review of significant growth issues.” Save the Lakes, 1999 Cal. App. LEXIS at *20. Clearly, however, this is wrong, and although the court tried mightily to explain how the water agencies’ water rights application could preclude analysis of any “significant growth issues,” it never quite explains what those “issues” are, or how their consideration would be precluded:

This sequence of events -- approving a water program before adopting a general plan -- precludes any proper review of significant growth issues. We explain.

In determining whether and where to permit development, a county must necessarily consider the availability of consumptive water supplies. If additional water supplies are available, growth and development are feasible. Conversely, if that water is not available, growth is necessarily limited.

If a general plan calls for increased development and population, a water plan to designed to meet that need makes sense. But here, no such determination was made. The County had not yet adopted a general plan or made final decisions on growth issues, and there was no final expression of county policy on these matters. By proposing a water project to meet the needs of the draft general plan, the analysis of certain issues was circumvented. That is, once the project made an additional 17,000 af/yr of water available, one of the natural barriers to growth was removed, and one of the major issues related to development no longer had to be considered. . . .

Under the present scenario, no entity has contemplated the interrelationship of growth and water sources. Making 17,000 af/yr of water available for consumptive purposes removes a major barrier to growth and can virtually ensure development. (See City of Antioch v. City Council (1986) 187 Cal. App. 3d 1325, 1337, 232 Cal. Rptr. 507.) By predicating a project on a draft general plan, without the benefit of a final expression of county policy, there is no guarantee that the inextricably linked issues of water supply and population growth will ever receive the appropriate environmental review. The County would have no reason to analyze what has become a nonexistent issue. Where, as here, there is a significant possibility, if not a probability, that there will be no analysis or reasoned consideration of the adoption of a general plan that restricts growth to a level less than that which will require an additional 17,000 af/yr, which restrictions would require less water and perhaps a different impact on the environment, the CEQA process has been abused.

Save the Lakes, 1999 Cal. App. LEXIS at *23-24.

The court’s primary fear appears to be that, “[b]y predicating a project on a draft general plan, without the benefit of a final expression of county policy, there is no guarantee that the inextricably linked issues of water supply and population growth will ever receive the appropriate environmental review.” Id., at *24. This fear is unjustified because, before the County could approve a general plan update that provides for increased growth, it must consider a range of alternatives to its proposed project, including a ‘no-growth’ alternative. CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.6. The fact that the water agencies have determined that at least 17,000 af/yr water is available does not relieve the County of its obligation under CEQA, in preparing the EIR in connection with its general plan update, to consider alternatives to its proposed growth targets or mitigate the impacts of approved growth.

Moreover, the court completely overlooked the fact that a water agency is obligated to consider all the significant environmental impacts of its projects, including cumulative impacts and growth-inducing impacts. See Public Resources Code § 21100(b)(1) and (5); CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15126.2, 15130. Although the Water Agency and EID apparently failed in this task, the court was mistaken in concluding -- flatly and without citing to CEQA or any other authority -- that “an EIR predicated on a draft general plan is fundamentally flawed and cannot pass CEQA muster.” Id. at *24.

The court’s opinion represents a classic example of the maxim, ‘bad facts make bad law.’ Because it appears that the Water Agency and EID failed to fully comply with CEQA by failing apparently to assess the cumulative and growth-inducing impacts of their project, the court could have invalidated the EIR on that basis alone. Instead, it held broadly that a water agency violates CEQA by adopting a water program based on anticipated growth before a city or county approves a general plan approving such growth. Given the statutory obligations of the land use planning agency, under both CEQA and the Government and Water Codes, the Save the Lakes court’s fear that the County “would have no reason to analyze what has become a nonexistent issue” was legally unfounded.

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4. CONCLUSION

The Save the Lakes decision is problematic for a number of reasons.

1. First, it ignores the fact that water agencies approving supply-related projects are specifically directed under CEQA to consider the cumulative and growth-inducing impacts of their actions. They are not, as the court suggested, constitutionally unable to evaluate the effects of their actions under CEQA.

2. Second, it assumes that if water agencies are permitted to supplement their water supplies in anticipation of increased demand, then local land use planning agencies will decline to consider water supply issues when preparing their land use plans. Although there may be a political temptation on the part of cities and counties to do so, the court's assumption is flawed from a legal standpoint because the Government Code, the Water Code, and CEQA all require local government agencies to consider the impacts of growth and the provision of water when preparing and evaluating their land use plans.

3. Finally, the court’s holding appears to be in conflict with the Diablo Grande case, which has been construed by some as prohibiting local governments from approving significant development plans without first securing permanent water supplies.

Although we disagree with this broad reading of Diablo Grande, its practical effect has been that local governments are now reluctant to approve any significant development plans unless and until the applicant has secured a permanent water supply. Contrasting this with the Save the Lakes decision, and it appears that the appellate courts are telling local governments and developers that they cannot approve general and/or specific plan amendments calling for increased growth without first securing adequate water supplies, while simultaneously telling water agencies that they cannot secure additional water supplies to serve projected growth unless and until the local government has approved a general plan calling allowing for such growth.

To the court’s credit, it understood that CEQA requires government agencies to incorporate all types of environmental concerns into their planning processes. The court appropriately analyzed in planning terms the policy question presented to it as a CEQA issue: Who will be responsible for considering water supply issues in planning for increased growth? Unfortunately, however, in answering this question the Court completely ignored the Government and Water Code’s extensive land use planning provisions, into which the Legislature has carefully incorporated consideration of water supply issues. As a result, the court got it wrong under CEQA.

DISCLAIMER: This discussion is general in nature and is not intended to and does not create a lawyer/client relationship. This discussion should in no way be relied upon or construed as legal advice, particularly since most legal outcomes are highly dependent on the facts of a particular case or situation. This discussion is provided on the condition that it cannot be referred to or quoted in any legal proceeding; if this condition is unacceptable to you, immediately delete this email and do not keep a copy of it in any form. The reader or recipient is strongly urged to consult with a lawyer for legal advice on these matters. Any reliance on the discussion information by someone who has not entered into a written retainer agreement with the lawyer providing the discussion information is at the reader's or recipient's own risk.

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